Thursday, October 7, 2010

Paper I, Semester III

Representing Politicism, Politicizing Representation
Cameron Bennett

During the question and answer session after MFA candidate Jason Lounds’ graduating talk, he was asked why his photographs, which involved the depiction of obviously heterosexual couples, did not represent any gay couples. His response was that the heterosexual experience was what he knew, and that was where he chose to focus. In other terms, the question opened up the issue of the representation of the Other in the work of art, a practice which many have attempted to show is inescapably ideological, political.

One might have noted the dominance of heterosexual couples in Lounds’ work and accused him of omission, of a kind of disavowal, of not representing a visible contingent of society. On the other hand, had Lounds chosen to depict gay couples in his work, others might have criticized him for being presumptuous, for attempting to represent an experience he himself could never really know, perhaps even for exoticizing the Other. One sees how easily a political aspect enters into artistic discourse, and one can see how inescapable these types of criticism are for the artist whose work is traditionally representational, as a photographer and a painter might be, and whose work then also represents society, as some photographers’ and painters’ work does. How relevant for me, then, a representational painter and a group 3 student studying the politics of representation in Critical Theory, to have witnessed Lounds’ exchange.

How is this relevant for me as a painter? First of all, I have a current fascination with signs and symbols, that is, one thing representing another, which has been a theme in my recent coursework. Secondly, as a portrait artist and illustrator, and even in my personal work, I have represented people of varying ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations. My interest in the variety of humanity has always motivated me to include that variety in my painting. But with representation comes responsibility. Is my illustration of a black man playing harmonica in the street a representation of a stereotype? In my painting of a homeless Argentine man unconscious in a doorway, have I entered into a violation of sorts of this man’s integrity, identity, and yes, even though he was in plain sight of thousands of passers-by, perhaps even his privacy? Or have I actually fulfilled a kind of obligation to represent these types of people, these Others? Or on the other hand, who am I to presume to give voice to these people?

In an effort to paint representationally, but yet, sidestep these issues, I recently produced a body of work in which I alone was the model for every piece. If one sees the artist as a mediator, as a represent-er of the experience of life which includes all of us, then the act of mediation becomes immediately politicized. Perhaps with these works alone, the only mediation occurring is a self-mediation, one in which I am not presuming anything because I am only addressing, representing, and attempting to give voice to my own experience, the experience of the Same, and not presuming to represent the Other at all. Also, tempted as I was to include in the work signs and symbols from “exotic” cultures, I was responsible enough to use only those from my own culture.

Of further relevance to me is the question: is abstract painting (non-objective, non-iconic) the most responsible form of painting because it never presumes to represent anything other than itself? If so, this would seem to support the Greenbergian notion of the necessary self-referential aspect a work of art must have to be valid. It would also seem to be the reason behind the omission of black activist art in favor black abstract painting in Janson’s 1962 art history text, as outlined in Maurice Berger’s article “Race and Representation.” I feel, however, that the argument of omission could be applied to abstract painting just as easily as it could be to realist painting, and so the idea that there exists a form of painting more responsible than another form is, actually, a myth.

So, in focusing on the Same or Self in his work, was Jason Lounds being omissive in his work, or merely honest? As Hans Haacke has stated: “There is no non-ideological position,” that is, there is nothing presentable which can be entirely divorced from one’s culture, from mediation, and therefore, from a politicization. If this is true, if there is no escaping politics in the arts, then why can’t I just paint whatever I wish, including and excluding the Other whenever and as much as I please? I should be able to, with impunity, as long as I am doing so with responsibility and without presumption. So, was Lounds representing responsibly? Of course he was…a representational focus on the Self is never irresponsible, unless expectations exist prior to that representation which calls for the representing of a broader spectrum.

In conclusion, the readings from the group 3 Critical Theory course related to my work in so far as they dealt with representation, but specifically with representation of the Other, and also with the myth of the unmediated (un-culturally biased) representation, or image. These are sociological aspects of representation. There is, however, also a stylistic and formal aspect of representation which is equally relevant for me, but less discussed in the course. This is the question of the politics of representational painting itself: that just as representation of the Other can be politically loaded in any medium, it can be shown that painting itself can be just as loaded, based solely on how representational (naturalistic, perceptual, or realistic) or non-representational (abstract, non-objective, non-iconic) it is.

Because representation in art is absolutely inescapable (art is representation) and with it politics, I feel liberated from attempting to express at every turn a proper political stance through my art. Nevertheless, in any representation, I bear a responsibility to at least attempt to represent in as unbiased a way as possible, even though I can never escape my cultural bias entirely.

As Zhang Longxi writes in “The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West”:“…to know the Other is a process of Bildung, of learning and self-cultivation, which is neither projecting the Self onto the Other nor erasing the Self with what belongs to the Other.” Representing in this way in my own medium of paint, as I believe Lounds did through his medium of photography, I can represent as honestly as possible myself or the Other.






Endnotes:

Maurice Berger, “Race and Representation,” How Art Becomes History, New York: IconEditions, 1992. p.86
Robert Morgan, “Interview With Hans Haacke,” Artists, Critics, Context, Readings in and Around American Art Since 1945, Ed. Paul Fabozzi, (Prentice Hall)2002, p. 309
Zhang Longxi, “The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West,” Critical Inquiry, Autumn, 1988, p.131

Bibliography:

Berger, Maurice.“Race and Representation,”How Art Becomes History. New York: IconEditions, 1992.

Longxi, Zhang. “The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West,” Critical Inquiry, Autumn, 1988: 108-131.

Owens, Craig. “The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. New York: New Press: W.W. Norton, 1998. 65-88

Solomon-Godeau, Abigail.“Going Native.” Art in America, July, 1999: 119-130.

Benjamin, Roger. “Matisse in Morocco: A Colonizing Esthetic?” Art in America, November, 1990: 156-211.

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