Paper I, Semester II

Turin and the Shroud of Levinas
Cameron Bennett
Written March, 2010
 
In his article “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” contemporary philosopher Edward S. Casey offers a critique of several points made by Emmanuel Levinas in a separate essay, “The Trace of the Other.” The points are many, but one of these deals with the nostalgic quality of memory.  I will comment on a few of Levinas’ ideas as they appear in “The Trace of the Other,” but this idea of the power of nostalgia will receive special attention because, as it is framed by Levinas and clarified by Casey, it appears to be underscored by a culture surrounding the Shroud of Turin, a particular relic of the Catholic Church, as is demonstrated in a third related essay about the Shroud by Georges Didi-Huberman, “The Index of the Absent Wound.”

The subject of the trace is what thematically underlies all three essays, and Levinas’ and Casey’s in particular address ideas of trace along the lines of memory. Casey lists three of Levinas’ points about memory from “The Trace of the Other” which culminate in the idea that a nostalgia-based memory can be problematic, and that because our memories shape our experience, they can influence the world negatively.  Casey writes:

“Most seriously, memory brings with it a nostalgia that locks it into a circuit of return to the Same…The nostalgic needful nature of memory helps to explain its deep penchant for recapture and reproduction---for re-presentation of the past…in fact it contributes to…the maintaining and strengthening of the psychism as the domain of the Same.”1

The problem lies in the psychism (soul and mind) of the self returning to the Same (the self, to use Levinas’ terminology), to what is familiar, comfortable.  This is a way of understanding nostalgia, which can be problematic when a world view is influenced by a fixation on the familiar.  In fact, it is this very problem of nostalgia which Didi-Huberman writes about in his article about the interpretation of the stains and traces found on the Shroud of Turin.

If we understand that those involved in the field of hermeneutics are those whose job it is to interpret scripture, and whose job it is to find the appropriate meaning in the interpretation of that scripture, then it is not a great leap to the concept that those official inspectors of the Shroud of Turin also act as hermeneuticists in their interpretation of the properties of the shroud itself, and whose job it is to prove its validity.  Didi-Huberman writes:

“The prodigality (sophism) of hermeneutics consists therefore in laying this trace over a story which it does not in any way represent.  If this constitutes an aporia, then it must be noted that a hermeneutic enterprise is able to override any semiotic aporia that threatens to impede the automovement of its figural certainty.” 2

The “trace” which Didi-Huberman mentions here is, obviously, the shroud, and the “story” is that of Christianity.  So much is at stake here for the hermeneuticist studying the shroud, that at any cost the shroud must be shown to be the thing which possesses the “figural certainty,” the correct meaning.  The shroud is supposedly the burial cloth of the crucified Jesus, covered with the bloodstains of his Passion.  But what if the stains are not blood after all?  Didi-Huberman states:

“The infallible method of peroxydation (used in legal medicine to test even invisible stains or very old stains) reveals nothing, nothing at all.  To this day there is no known blood to be found on the holy shroud.” 3
 
Would this not ultimately end whatever credibility the shroud has enjoyed up to this point as a holy relic?  Not if, as mentioned above, “the hermeneutic enterprise is able to override any semiotic aporia that threatens to impede the automovement of its figural certainty.”  Didi-Huberman continues:
 
“ But first it must be stated that in that very place where figuration abolishes itself---as in this stain---it also generates itself.  This, in a way, amounts to setting forth a transcendental phenomenology of the visible, which would describe with regard to this stain, appearance…the very process of disfiguration; it would describe how this stain came not to possess a figurative aspect.  That requires in any case inventing a structure of substitutions, returns, and representations; a structure of retracement.  Retrace, in other words, tell, retell a story, but also trace a line over it, a line that, let’s say, will make the original trace ‘represent  a subject for other traces,’ those traditional narratives known as the gospels.” 4

In other words, no matter what, the shroud will be proven to be authentic.  Here we have the perfect embodiment of “…a nostalgia that locks it into a circuit of return to the Same,” Casey’s words, the reiteration of Levinas’ thoughts on nostalgic memory, as quoted at the beginning of this essay.

Thus, on one hand, Levinas’ concept of nostalgia would seem to damn the validity of the shroud.  On the other hand, however, if the shroud could still be seen as an authentic relic of the Passion of Jesus, it might be seen as such also because of, ironically, other threads of Levinas’ enigmatic thought.

Levinas in many ways, distances himself from modern philosophical thought, which he calls “atheistic.”  Levinas himself, though never acknowledging the existence of a personal God, still considers himself part of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.  The tone of his writing in “The Trace of the Other” could be confusing, however, to those unfamiliar with him (like myself, I confess, who at the time of this writing have only read “The Trace of the Other”).  He could be seen, through his quest to join himself with the Other (his idea of God) as a monotheist apologist.  In any event, there exists in “The Trace of the Other” much which would appear to parallel the thought of those attempting to validify the shroud.

If the shroud must be shown to be authentic in spite of the lack of blood in its stains, then “…inventing a structure of substitutions, returns, and representations; a structure of retracement…” is required.   Didi-Huberman offers the following:

“…this does not really constitute an objection to ‘authenticity’ (to divinity)…the blood-substance will in all cases be transformed…and in all cases the contact, implied by the trace, will be transformed by a vector of virgin passage (crossing a surface without touching it: the birth of Christ, Pentecost, and his resurrection, all from the linen shroud).” 5

  Compare this to Levinas in “Trace of the Other”:

“He who left traces in wiping out his traces did not mean to say or do anything by the traces he left.  He disturbed the order in an irreparable way.  He has passed absolutely.  To be qua leaving a trace is to pass, to depart, to absolve oneself…This trace can be taken in its turn as a sign…In addition to what the sign signifies, it is the past of him who delivered  the sign.” 6

…or Casey, reiterating Levinas in “Levinas On Memory and Trace”:

 “The Trace brings Presence and Absence together in a third way as well:  neither as illumination nor as dissimulation but as Presence-of-Absence-in-Passage.” 7
 
Perhaps Didi-Huberman says it best:

 “…the effacement of all figuration in this trace is itself the guarantee of a link, of authenticity: if there is no figuration it is because contact has taken place…The absence of figuration therefore serves as proof of its existence.” 8

In other words, in a very enigmatic way, because Levinas admits to traces, admits to the indexicality of traces, and situates this world inside the trace of the Other (God), any and all traces in the world are genuine indexes of God’s contact, including the stains in the shroud.  For the believer in the authenticity of the shroud as relic this translates into: God removed the blood for his own purposes, but left the stain. 

  I find that there is a perplexing, paradoxical quality to much of Levinas’ writing in “The Trace of the Other.”  In “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” Casey himself criticizes Levinas’ enigmas, just as in “The Index of the Absent Wound” Georges Didi-Huberman criticizes the hermeneutic enterprise of the many defenders of the shroud of Turin.  The paradoxes arise when we see how Levinas is tied to the monotheism under fire in Didi-Huberman’s article.  This poses a question: how and for what reason does Levinas choose to base his philosophy on an idea of God, regardless of what he calls it (the face, the Other, the Il, Illeity, the He, the beyond)? Could it be that Levinas himself is guilty of nostalgia, that he feels most comfortable framing his thought within a monotheistic paradigm?  For, although he denies belief in a personal God, his general tone is one which echoes and is echoed in monotheism.  A brief example:

  Saint Cyril of Jerusalem writes:

“ …by receiving the imprint (to antitupon: the index) of the Holy Spirit, everything is accomplished in you as image (eikonikos: as icon), because you are the images of  Christ.” 9

 Levinas writes:

 “To be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his trace…He shows himself only by his trace, as is said in Exodus 33.” 10

In conclusion, I have tried to show that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in its concept of trace as nostalgic memory is capable of challenging  religion in its hermeneutic enterprise.  I have also attempted to show that Levinas’ concept of Other closely parallels monotheism, and is simultaneously capable of validating and invalidating its enterprise.  I have tried to show that Georges Didi-Huberman, ironically, by his invalidation of a monotheistic enterprise, has actually validated and, to a certain extent, invalidated Levinas’ philosophy.  Finally, because of his Other-oriented philosophy, I posed the question of the possibility of Levinas being subject to his own concept of nostalgia, which would also further undermine his philosophy.
 
Endnotes

1. Edward Casey, “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” The Collegium    Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, ed. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and Tamineaux. (Kluwer Academic Publishers [NL], 1988) p. 245, 246
2.  George Didi-Huberman, “The Index of the Absent Wound,” October, date unknown: 67
3. Didi-Huberman 81
4. Didi-Huberman 67
5. Didi-Huberman 81
6. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other,” Deconstruction In Context, ed. Mark Taylor (University of Chicago Press Books, 1986) p.357
7. Casey 253
8. Didi-Huberman 67, 68
9. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses mystagogiques, ed. Piedagnel, Cerf, Paris, 1966, II, p.1.
10. Levinas 359

Bibliography

Casey, Edward. “Levinas on Memory and Trace.” The Collegium  Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years.  Ed. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and Tamineaux. University of Chicago Press Books, 1986

Didi-Huberman, Georges.  “The Index of the Absent Wound: Monograph on a Stain.”  October (date unknown): 63-81

Levinas, Emmanuel.  “The Trace of the Other.”  Deconstruction In Context. Ed. Mark Taylor. University of Chicago Press Books, 1986