Monday, March 8, 2010

Paper I, Semester II

Turin and the Shroud of Levinas
Cameron Bennett
Written March, 2010
 
In his article “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” contemporary philosopher Edward S. Casey offers a critique of several points made by Emmanuel Levinas in a separate essay, “The Trace of the Other.” The points are many, but one of these deals with the nostalgic quality of memory.  I will comment on a few of Levinas’ ideas as they appear in “The Trace of the Other,” but this idea of the power of nostalgia will receive special attention because, as it is framed by Levinas and clarified by Casey, it appears to be underscored by a culture surrounding the Shroud of Turin, a particular relic of the Catholic Church, as is demonstrated in a third related essay about the Shroud by Georges Didi-Huberman, “The Index of the Absent Wound.”

The subject of the trace is what thematically underlies all three essays, and Levinas’ and Casey’s in particular address ideas of trace along the lines of memory. Casey lists three of Levinas’ points about memory from “The Trace of the Other” which culminate in the idea that a nostalgia-based memory can be problematic, and that because our memories shape our experience, they can influence the world negatively.  Casey writes:

“Most seriously, memory brings with it a nostalgia that locks it into a circuit of return to the Same…The nostalgic needful nature of memory helps to explain its deep penchant for recapture and reproduction---for re-presentation of the past…in fact it contributes to…the maintaining and strengthening of the psychism as the domain of the Same.”1

The problem lies in the psychism (soul and mind) of the self returning to the Same (the self, to use Levinas’ terminology), to what is familiar, comfortable.  This is a way of understanding nostalgia, which can be problematic when a world view is influenced by a fixation on the familiar.  In fact, it is this very problem of nostalgia which Didi-Huberman writes about in his article about the interpretation of the stains and traces found on the Shroud of Turin.

If we understand that those involved in the field of hermeneutics are those whose job it is to interpret scripture, and whose job it is to find the appropriate meaning in the interpretation of that scripture, then it is not a great leap to the concept that those official inspectors of the Shroud of Turin also act as hermeneuticists in their interpretation of the properties of the shroud itself, and whose job it is to prove its validity.  Didi-Huberman writes:

“The prodigality (sophism) of hermeneutics consists therefore in laying this trace over a story which it does not in any way represent.  If this constitutes an aporia, then it must be noted that a hermeneutic enterprise is able to override any semiotic aporia that threatens to impede the automovement of its figural certainty.” 2

The “trace” which Didi-Huberman mentions here is, obviously, the shroud, and the “story” is that of Christianity.  So much is at stake here for the hermeneuticist studying the shroud, that at any cost the shroud must be shown to be the thing which possesses the “figural certainty,” the correct meaning.  The shroud is supposedly the burial cloth of the crucified Jesus, covered with the bloodstains of his Passion.  But what if the stains are not blood after all?  Didi-Huberman states:

“The infallible method of peroxydation (used in legal medicine to test even invisible stains or very old stains) reveals nothing, nothing at all.  To this day there is no known blood to be found on the holy shroud.” 3
 
Would this not ultimately end whatever credibility the shroud has enjoyed up to this point as a holy relic?  Not if, as mentioned above, “the hermeneutic enterprise is able to override any semiotic aporia that threatens to impede the automovement of its figural certainty.”  Didi-Huberman continues:
 
“ But first it must be stated that in that very place where figuration abolishes itself---as in this stain---it also generates itself.  This, in a way, amounts to setting forth a transcendental phenomenology of the visible, which would describe with regard to this stain, appearance…the very process of disfiguration; it would describe how this stain came not to possess a figurative aspect.  That requires in any case inventing a structure of substitutions, returns, and representations; a structure of retracement.  Retrace, in other words, tell, retell a story, but also trace a line over it, a line that, let’s say, will make the original trace ‘represent  a subject for other traces,’ those traditional narratives known as the gospels.” 4

In other words, no matter what, the shroud will be proven to be authentic.  Here we have the perfect embodiment of “…a nostalgia that locks it into a circuit of return to the Same,” Casey’s words, the reiteration of Levinas’ thoughts on nostalgic memory, as quoted at the beginning of this essay.

Thus, on one hand, Levinas’ concept of nostalgia would seem to damn the validity of the shroud.  On the other hand, however, if the shroud could still be seen as an authentic relic of the Passion of Jesus, it might be seen as such also because of, ironically, other threads of Levinas’ enigmatic thought.

Levinas in many ways, distances himself from modern philosophical thought, which he calls “atheistic.”  Levinas himself, though never acknowledging the existence of a personal God, still considers himself part of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.  The tone of his writing in “The Trace of the Other” could be confusing, however, to those unfamiliar with him (like myself, I confess, who at the time of this writing have only read “The Trace of the Other”).  He could be seen, through his quest to join himself with the Other (his idea of God) as a monotheist apologist.  In any event, there exists in “The Trace of the Other” much which would appear to parallel the thought of those attempting to validify the shroud.

If the shroud must be shown to be authentic in spite of the lack of blood in its stains, then “…inventing a structure of substitutions, returns, and representations; a structure of retracement…” is required.   Didi-Huberman offers the following:

“…this does not really constitute an objection to ‘authenticity’ (to divinity)…the blood-substance will in all cases be transformed…and in all cases the contact, implied by the trace, will be transformed by a vector of virgin passage (crossing a surface without touching it: the birth of Christ, Pentecost, and his resurrection, all from the linen shroud).” 5

  Compare this to Levinas in “Trace of the Other”:

“He who left traces in wiping out his traces did not mean to say or do anything by the traces he left.  He disturbed the order in an irreparable way.  He has passed absolutely.  To be qua leaving a trace is to pass, to depart, to absolve oneself…This trace can be taken in its turn as a sign…In addition to what the sign signifies, it is the past of him who delivered  the sign.” 6

…or Casey, reiterating Levinas in “Levinas On Memory and Trace”:

 “The Trace brings Presence and Absence together in a third way as well:  neither as illumination nor as dissimulation but as Presence-of-Absence-in-Passage.” 7
 
Perhaps Didi-Huberman says it best:

 “…the effacement of all figuration in this trace is itself the guarantee of a link, of authenticity: if there is no figuration it is because contact has taken place…The absence of figuration therefore serves as proof of its existence.” 8

In other words, in a very enigmatic way, because Levinas admits to traces, admits to the indexicality of traces, and situates this world inside the trace of the Other (God), any and all traces in the world are genuine indexes of God’s contact, including the stains in the shroud.  For the believer in the authenticity of the shroud as relic this translates into: God removed the blood for his own purposes, but left the stain. 

  I find that there is a perplexing, paradoxical quality to much of Levinas’ writing in “The Trace of the Other.”  In “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” Casey himself criticizes Levinas’ enigmas, just as in “The Index of the Absent Wound” Georges Didi-Huberman criticizes the hermeneutic enterprise of the many defenders of the shroud of Turin.  The paradoxes arise when we see how Levinas is tied to the monotheism under fire in Didi-Huberman’s article.  This poses a question: how and for what reason does Levinas choose to base his philosophy on an idea of God, regardless of what he calls it (the face, the Other, the Il, Illeity, the He, the beyond)? Could it be that Levinas himself is guilty of nostalgia, that he feels most comfortable framing his thought within a monotheistic paradigm?  For, although he denies belief in a personal God, his general tone is one which echoes and is echoed in monotheism.  A brief example:

  Saint Cyril of Jerusalem writes:

“ …by receiving the imprint (to antitupon: the index) of the Holy Spirit, everything is accomplished in you as image (eikonikos: as icon), because you are the images of  Christ.” 9

 Levinas writes:

 “To be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his trace…He shows himself only by his trace, as is said in Exodus 33.” 10

In conclusion, I have tried to show that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in its concept of trace as nostalgic memory is capable of challenging  religion in its hermeneutic enterprise.  I have also attempted to show that Levinas’ concept of Other closely parallels monotheism, and is simultaneously capable of validating and invalidating its enterprise.  I have tried to show that Georges Didi-Huberman, ironically, by his invalidation of a monotheistic enterprise, has actually validated and, to a certain extent, invalidated Levinas’ philosophy.  Finally, because of his Other-oriented philosophy, I posed the question of the possibility of Levinas being subject to his own concept of nostalgia, which would also further undermine his philosophy.
 
Endnotes

1. Edward Casey, “Levinas on Memory and Trace,” The Collegium    Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, ed. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and Tamineaux. (Kluwer Academic Publishers [NL], 1988) p. 245, 246
2.  George Didi-Huberman, “The Index of the Absent Wound,” October, date unknown: 67
3. Didi-Huberman 81
4. Didi-Huberman 67
5. Didi-Huberman 81
6. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other,” Deconstruction In Context, ed. Mark Taylor (University of Chicago Press Books, 1986) p.357
7. Casey 253
8. Didi-Huberman 67, 68
9. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses mystagogiques, ed. Piedagnel, Cerf, Paris, 1966, II, p.1.
10. Levinas 359

Bibliography


Casey, Edward. “Levinas on Memory and Trace.” The Collegium  Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years.  Ed. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and Tamineaux. University of Chicago Press Books, 1986

Didi-Huberman, Georges.  “The Index of the Absent Wound: Monograph on a Stain.”  October (date unknown): 63-81

Levinas, Emmanuel.  “The Trace of the Other.”  Deconstruction In Context. Ed. Mark Taylor. University of Chicago Press Books, 1986
 
 
 

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Semester I work, Fall 2009




Residency II Summary

Residency II Summary
Cameron Bennett
Written January 20, 2010

1. Discussion of the critiques of the content, concept, and technique of my work

My work was met with very little enthusiasm this residency. In general, there appeared to be confusion about my direction. The only positive comments I received were very superficial, and they came from two or three fellow students, and visiting artist Vincent Desiderio, who claimed to enjoy the new textures with which I was experimenting. Aside from that, most criticism was that the works looked too much like illustrations or political cartoons, lacked subtlety, that my colors were garish and that, in general, the technique seemed arbitrary and unrelated to the content. Further, faculty and students suggested that the first and second semester were for the student's artistic exploration, not for crystallizing thesis ideas.
My response to this is that the blatantly obvious choice of imagery in the work was entirely intentional, and was intended to lack subtlety. I realize that in the eyes of many of my peers, conveying a clear message immediately takes me out of the realm of “fine art” and puts me squarely into the “illustration” camp. I think this is short-sighted, however, and confess that the easily readable nature of the works were a reaction against the vague quality of contemporary art which truly irritates me. I have written about this “vagueness” in an earlier essay.
I also stand by my use of the textured surface of the paintings as not at all arbitrary. The reason for calling attention to the texture is to state an awareness of the painting as “object.” The heavy facture is intended as a break from an illusionistic style of painting into a handling which calls more attention to the medium itself. Painters always work on a surface which stretches from edge to edge of that surface; I merely magnified its already existing texture.
As for the lack of unification of content and technique, my intent was to make marks which were more abstract, more obvious, more sign/symbol-like, to comment on the use of signs and symbols themselves, another theme of the work. This connection was not made by my critics, or at least not addressed. My colors were also criticized as being garish. The colors I used were, I confess, very much an afterthought, but I think they work after all, however, as the pageantry of religion and sports often uses bright colors. Further, in a critique with Oliver Wasow, comparisons were drawn between my work and the work of sports-illustrator LeRoy Nieman, an artist previously unknown to me whose work uses highly chromatic color and rough textures. This comparison would seem to lend a relevance to the colors and technique of my semester's work.
I give this defense for my work here because I found time would not allow for it during critiques.
Although I made certain decisions for the work with particular ends in mind, I do not disagree that the work could have been more successful in terms of communicating those ends. This is a paradox for me at present: how can I communicate more clearly while maintaining some air of mystery, poetry, and subtlety in the works?

2. Suggestions made by faculty, students, and visiting artist during critiques

Faculty

Deborah Davidson suggested I put the ideas of my work into the paint itself, using Francis Bacon as an example. She recommended looking at the work of Boston painter Emily Eveleth, photographer Dihn Q. Le, and videographer Paul Pfieffer. She felt I should darken my palette. She suggested I use a more fragmentary way of showing the iconography.
John Kramer liked my charcoal exploratory drawings most, saying they “tell less” than the more
finished color pieces. He left me with the question: how to tell less without being vague. He also
warned me not to try to appropriate new philosophical ideas in a pretentious way.
Oscar Wasow challenged me to “say less or say differently.” He recommended looking at the work of illustrator LeRoy Nieman, and to find a better way of “presenting the idea,” saying the texture of the paintings was reminiscent of cheap paintings reproduced on texured paper.
Sunanda Sanyal, my advisor for this semester, felt that my “best bet” is to somehow marry my
illustration techniques with appropriation. He continued to urge me, as he did last residency, to studyRoy Lichtenstein, Tom Wesselman, Audrey Flack, Ralph Goings, and Malcolm Morley. He also supplied me with a wealth of reading material by Kate Linker, Jean Baudrillard, Silvio Gaggi, and Bradford Collins.

Visiting Artist

Vincent Desiderio urged me to “maintain an awareness of 'kitsch.'” He wondered if I could take my Gibson-style pen and ink drawings to the level of “art” by adding something unexpected to them. He encouraged me to further my approach “via force,” to find ways to make the images more powerful,possibly by using a simpler, muted palette. He encouraged me to “allegorize via optical method,” as he believes Delacroix and Picasso had done. He also suggested me to “escape from facility” by making “more violent marks,” and to try less familiar materials like bee's wax mixed with charcoal, bitumen, and printer's ink.

Graduating Students

Cynthia Hauk recommended “having more intentionality with the materials.”
Heather Hilton suggested looking more at film and photography, not just at painting. She
recommended looking at Fairfield Porter, and suggested finding a mentor who is very much about “paint.”
Nathan Stromberg thought I should do more preliminary drawings for the pieces, plan them more. “Quality, not quantity.” He told me to read about artists Mark Tansey, Gerhard Richter, Wayne Thiebaud, Robert Bechtle, Neo Rauch, and Michael Borremans.
I signed up for a critique with Reed Easley because her work dealt with simulation, and I felt she could give me some good suggestions for whom to read. She recommended Walter Benjamin, Ben Singer, Foucault, and naturally Baudrillard. She discouraged me from “looking for theory” and then “putting myself into it.” She said I ought to “go in two directions at once,” doing two different kinds of work during the next semester: literal and abstract.
Stacey Cushner urged me to paint what truly moves me, to get to the “important idea.” She told me to
do pictures, but to do less conventional pictures, to be “adventurous.” She also encouraged me to
experiment, but to continue to stay in touch with myself and my original vision. She recommended reading “Uncontrollable Beauty,” and “Beauty and Art.”
I was interested in a critique with Mark McKee because his ends as a painter are similar, if not exact, to mine. He had a wealth of reading to recommend to me: “Phenomenology of Painting,” “What Painting Is,” “Phenomenology of Perception,” “Meaning in the Visual Arts,” and other books on American
realism. He also suggested to continue researching logos, graffiti tags, and to look at the history of badges and emblems.

3. Critical Theory course with Michael Newman

Remarkably, the themes of the Critical Study course (semiotics, marks, traces, indexical relationships, blindness) were very much in line with what I had been working on for much of the semester (signs, symbols, mark-making, relinquishing control, allegory). The readings were very dense, however, and I will have to continue to find time to read and re-read them.
My brief presentation before the class on index and palimpsest seemed to go well, again owing to the happy overlapping of my own studies during the semester and the themes of the Critical Theory readings. At least three students in the class discussed palimpsest with me after my presentation.

Artist Statement, Second Residency

CAMERON BENNETT:
ARTIST STATEMENT
Spring 2010
Group II

All around us we see the display of tribal emblems: religious, political, cultural, sexual. What is of especial interest to me is the habit of displaying these emblems on oneself, especially sports emblems.
Using visual metaphor, and working in a style which calls attention to its extrinsic painterly qualities, I am attempting to raise questions about the use of representation, not only sociologically (as in the importance attached to the emblem as a representation of tribal identification) but philosophically as well (as in the drawn or painted mark of the artist as an emblem, simulation, or representation of the visual world).

End of Semester I Summary

Fall 2009, First Semester Summary
Cameron Bennett
Written December 2009

One goal for myself for this semester, my first in the AIB MFA program, was to begin to paint in a new way. Happily, this has happened. Another important goal for myself was to better be able to articulate my place in contemporary art using contemporary art language. Happily, I feel, this has also happened. A third goal for myself was to find a painter-mentor who would be able to help me in each of these areas. I feel that this, too, has happened.

I. Studio Component

I began this semester with an urgent desire to break into a new way of handling paint. My plan was to begin this search for what would be a new approach by experimenting with unfamiliar ways of markmaking. This I did, as documented in an earlier paper My New Hat, and when I put the mark-making experiments aside, I had arrived at something rather different for myself: exaggerated surface texture.
The exaggerated texture of my recent work calls attention to the medium of the paint more than my finely crafted paintings had done, thus, calling more attention to them as paintings. My role as mediator is made obvious with these paintings. They are unapologetically what they are.
I also switched to a previously-disliked medium this semester: acrylic paint. Its quick-drying property allowed me to exploit texture much more easily than the oil paint I had been using. In one piece, I also experimented with mixed media, adding paper over painted canvas in places and drawing on the same painted surface in ink.

The paintings done in the second half of the semester, those which relate most closely to my potential thesis, are allegorical, clearly something other than traditional, naturalistic pictures. I will elaborate about my research into the use of allegory in the next section of this paper, but I will say here that one understanding of allegorical images is that they possess meaning. This my works certainly have. I anticipate negative criticism, however, about the lack of subtlety in the messages. At this point, however, I am not sure that my ideas (sports culture replacing religious culture, tribal behavior in contemporary society) need to be more complex than they are. Further, I am not sure how I would make them more complex if I had to. If there is room for the growth of my concepts, hopefully this will occur as I progress through the course of study.

One area in which I feel I have not arrived at a new approach is in my ink drawings. Although I
produced many Pollock-inspired experiments with ink at the beginning of the semester, I found myself focusing more on painting throughout the rest of the semester. In the time available to me, I am not sure how I could have made more time to go further with my ink-studies.
In short, I am generally pleased with the new work done this semester. I have a new approach for painting, and also ideas that I feel have a lot of potential for images. Using this new approach I was able to produce five large, finished paintings, and several smaller pieces. What I am displeased with, however, is my continued reliance on photography, which I feel undermines my validity as a realist painter.

II. Academic Component

My academic goal this semester was to begin the process of defining myself in relation to the issues of other contemporary artists like myself, who are working with similar goals in mind.
One of these issues is the concept of kitsch. I read the essay Avant-Garde and Kitsch by Clement
Greenburg which defines virtually all realist art as kitsch, and also contemporary realist painter Odd Nerdrum's collection of essays On Kitsch, which accepts this idea. There is much more investigation into this theme that I could undertake. I am not sure that I am ready to call myself a kitsch painter.

As mentioned often throughout my papers this semester, I have been eager to begin producing
allegorical paintings. Somehow, I failed to include any writings on allegory in my Academic
Component Independent Study Contract at the close of the first residency. After a mid-semester
discussion with advisor John Kramer, however, it was agreed that during the semester I should also be researching contemporary use of allegory in art. This modified my reading list to include Craig Owens' "The Allegorical Impulse," as well as other essays and monographs on artists R.B. Kitaj, Samuel Bak, and Jasper Johns. I also spent many hours reviewing magazines featuring contemporary artists whose work is allegorical or symbolic. Happily, after this research, seeing that it is alive and well in the current art world, I feel reinforced in my decision to create work which uses allegory.
Although I included it in my academic contract, at the time of this writing, I have not read Donald Kuspit's book The End of Art. This is due to the amount of time devoted to researching works on allegory not included in the original reading list. I also would like to have begun reading works on Structuralist philosophy this semester.

III. Mentor

My mentor, Patrick McCay, turned out to be a very good choice. I chose Patrick because his work contained elements of representation and abstraction. He seemed to me to be a logical choice for someone like myself trying to bridge both realms. Patrick was well-informed regarding contemporary art practice, and being a painter himself, he was able to offer me critical advice relevant to a painter.
Patrick surprised me in his understanding of issues relevant to my course of study. He was familiar with and able to speak about the Neo-Expressionists and the French Structuralists, a group of thinkers new to me since beginning my study at the AIB.
Happily, I found that the theme of sports-fanaticism resonated strongly with Patrick. Based on his experiences at Notre Dame University, he had much to offer me in the way of direction for my thesis.
Although my initial idea for my thesis was sports fanaticism as an example of tribal behavior, Patrick liked the parallels I had begun to draw between sports and religion, and he went a step further than me, focusing on the idea of hero-worship. Here he saw limitless possibilities for expansion on the idea of sports hero as religious authority or priest.

IV. Plans for Spring 2010, Second Semester

At this point, my plan for the studio component of the Spring semester is to continue refining my new approach in acrylic paint. I would like to experiment further with collage. I also would like to devote more time to finding new approaches for my ink-drawings, experimenting with scale, and to possibly carry them into the acrylic paintings. I would also like to do more work without the use of photographic reference, especially as this is an issue I broach in my artist statement and it is one about which I have strong feelings. I plan to continue refining my ideas along the lines of tribal behavior and its visual emblems, composing multi-figure compostions on a large scale.
Plans for the academic component for next semester will be to try to find more philosophical writings on the use of photography among realist painters. At some point, probably next semester, I feel I will need to begin reading about sociology as well, since my thesis is not merely an artistic one but a sociological one as well. Hopefully, sociological reading will help me to refine my thesis. I also would like to begin readings in Structuralist philosophy.

Plans for a mentor for next semester would be to find another realist painter, one who works heavily with allegory. Two possibilities are Paul Rahilly and Samuel Bak, both in the Boston area.

Bibliography, Semester I

Bibliography
End of First Semester, Fall 2009
Cameron Bennett

Bloomfeld, Maureen. “The Mirror As Muse.” The Artist's Magazine October 2008: 32-39
(Article on artist Alan Feltus)

Brown, David. “Academic, But Alive.” The Artist's Magazine January/February 2009: 37-43
(Article on artist Will Wilson)

Carsten, Robert. “Compassionate Painter of Modern Life.” The Artist's Magazine July/August 2009:38-45
(Article on artist George Tooker)

Diefendorf, Jeffrey M. and Mara R. Witzling. The Art of Samuel Bak, Memory and Metaphor,
The Art Gallery, University of NH, 2006

Grootenboer, Hanneke. The Rhetoric of Perspective-Realism and Illusionism in 17th Century Dutch Still-Life Painting. University of Chicago Press, 2005

Greenberg, Clement. Avant-Garde and Kitsch.
http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/kitsch.html

Meyer, Ruth K. “Beautiful Ambiguity.” The Artist's Magazine September 2009: 28-35
(Article on artists Igor Kozlosky and Marina Sharapova)

Meyer, Ruth K. “Two Roads Converge.” The Artist's Magazine November 2009: 37-43
(Article on artists Suzanne Scherer and Pabel Ouporov)

Muente, Tamara Lenz. “Carnival of Dreams.” The Artist's Magazine June 2009: 42-29
(Article on artist Lani Irwin)

Nerdrum, Odd. On Kitsch. Kagge Forlag, 2001

Novak, Michael. Joy of Sports. Basic Books, Inc, 1971

Owens, Craig. The Allegorical Impulse. Art After Modernism: Rethinking Representation. Ed. Brian Wallis. The New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1984

Peaker, Giles. Natural History, Kitaj, Allegory and Memory. Critical Kitaj. Ed. Aulich, James and
John Lynch. Rutgers University Press, 2001

Steinberg, Leo. Other Criteria. Oxford University Press, 1972

Theotocatos, Paula. “Facing Life Head-On.” The Artist's Magazine June 2008: 52-58
(Article on artist Terry Moore Strickland)

Weiss, Jeffrey. Jasper Johns, An Allegory of Painting, 1955-1965. National Gallery of Art,
Washington 2007

Paper III, Semester I

Palimpsest and Discursivity: An Investigation Of Allegory
Cameron Bennett
Written September 2009

I.

As an artist in the process of creating a series of allegorical works, the question of the precise meaning of allegory is essential, especially as distinct from metaphor and symbol. Hitherto, my use of each of these words was interchangeable and I used any and all of them to describe the same kind of art. The trend in art of using the human figure to represent an aspect of nature, or culture, probably was my clearest conception of allegory, especially as used in the 19th century by artists like Gustave Klimt and Alphonse Mucha. I would have just as easily called the disrobing human figure in a work titled SCIENCE REVEALING ITSELF an allegorical, metaphoric, or symbolic representation of Science.
As I was very surprised to find, however, there exists much complicated philosophical thought on the subject of allegory. So, for practical reasons, I am forced to narrow the scope of this essay and focus on allegory alone.

II.

Interestingly, much of the early influential thought surrounding allegory, comes to us through a German filter. The Romanticist scholars and philosophers Winckelmann (1717-1768), Goethe (1749-1832), and Schelling (1775-1854) all attempted to develop the meaning of allegory. Winckelmann offered an early definition of allegory as every image which contains meaning. His is the simplest and, therefore, seems to lend the most clarity to an understanding allegory. Goethe and Schelling, as philosophers will do, added daunting levels of complexity to the subject. Curiously, they involved themselves in a philosophical pitting of allegory against symbol, ultimately assigning greater importance to symbol. Their influence was so profound that allegory was very little used until the beginning of the 20th century. Walter Benjamin(1892-1940) continued to develop theories about allegory as it manifested itself in German drama, attempted to refute the arguments of the Romanticists, and sought to re-establish its importance. Ultimately, critics such as Paul de Man and Craig Owens wrote about allegory's re-emergence and re-entrenchment in the arts of the later 20th century.

In THE RHETORIC OF PERSPECTIVE, author Hanneke Grootenboer writes:
“Allegory has been defined by Paul de Man, Benjamin, and Owens, among others, as that which emerges under the melancholy gaze, expresses itself in ruins, establishes a distance to its own
origin that it never reaches, and desires to fix the ephemeral in an image.”(136) One key component of allegory as accepted by Owens is the idea of allegory as a reinterpretation of a prior idea, a palimpsest. Another is the discursive quality of allegory, its movement from topic to topic, reference to reference, which often results in the clouding of its meaning. In THE ALLEGORICAL IMPULSE, a highly influential article and the chief source of information on the contemporary use of allegory in this essay, Owens demonstrates that allegory is especially present in postmodern art. According to Owens, allegory occurs anytime an artist appropriates or reinterprets a prior image, physical space, or idea into his or her own work. It is simple to see, then, how much contemporary art could be considered allegorical, especially with the postmodern questioning of the possibility of originality: installation, assemblage, collage, photography, painting, and especially film-making; all require pre-existing phenomena for their own iconography.
Owens writes: “Appropriation, site-specificity, impermanence, accumulation, discursivity, hybridization---these diverse strategies characterize much of the art of the present and distinguish it from its modernist predecessors.”(209) Based on this, Owens considers the site-specific art of Robert Smithson allegorical in its appropriation of the landscape, and also in its transience: “...the site specific work becomes an emblem of transience...the memento mori of the 20th century.”(209)
Interestingly, this idea of allegory as a discursive act is what the German Romanticists saw as a
problem of allegory, that allegory referred to a meaning it did not itself contain, that the origins of its referrals were lost in a mise-en abyme and could never be found or known. Allegory was, therefore, vague. Vagueness of meaning, as I mention in my earlier essay RE-EVALUATING SKILL THROUGH A POSTMODERN LENS, seems to be a desirable quality in contemporary art. Viewers are invited to create their own interpretations of artworks. If vagueness is one of the hallmarks of allegory, one then sees a reason why allegory has returned to popularity in art, as Craig Owens says it has.
Other artists, such as Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, and R. B. Kitaj, contribute works
which deliberately operate on a discursive model. The idea of fragment in allegorical theory is very similar to that of ruin; fragments are residual parts of something which may be reinterpreted. Each offers fragments of images or objects, objects which trace their meanings back to a prior origin, which we can or cannot know. Johns used fragments of the human body in his work, casts of body parts, the residual imprint of his own face on paper, his Skin Drawings. With works like Rebus and Allegory, Rauschenberg is credited with transferring the Western experience of art from the visual to the textual. These pieces are syntagmatic, that is, they resemble a narrative sequence, a procession of pictograms, a text more than a picture. Yet, true to the postmodernist allegorist, it is a text which is unreadable, and Owens himself writes: “...it remains impossible to read a Rauschenberg , if by reading we mean the extraction from a text of a coherent , monological message.”(225) Kitaj, working in a quasi-abstract, representational style, creates fragmentary images composed of other images. He also hyperbolizes the allegorical leap from the thing represented to its distant meaning. “Desk Murder” is the title of one of his paintings, one in which there is a desk, but no trace of murder. Kitaj also alludes to a selfconsciousness of allegory in his work, including an obscured portrait of Walter Benjamin in a figure group in one of his paintings.

III.

If allegory has developed into something which “...emerges under the melancholy gaze,
expresses itself in ruins, establishes a distance to its own origin that it never reaches, and desires to fix the ephemeral in an image,” my question is: Why? Why are these the accepted qualities of allegory?
My own personal opinion about this definition is that it need not necessarily define all allegory. Why must all allegories represent transience, ephemera? Why must the distance between symbols and their meanings never be reached? If it were so, then we ought to feel pathos, which probably we would not feel, at the allegorical representation of happiness with a smiley yellow happy-face symbol. In our example the allegory actually does reach the distance to its own origin; the meaning is perfectly clear.
As long as symbols are part of the cultural consciousness, the distance between the symbol and its origin will be reached. Why the need to embark on this investigation of allegory in the first place? In my most recent artist statement I mention that there is in me a frustrated symbolist straining to be released and that I hope to have the opportunity to create more images which involve the use of visual metaphor. Some would argue that art which uses any allegory and symbolism will be lost on a general audience. In defense of allegory, however, I argue that the goal of the artist is to produce work which operates on many levels. The meanings behind Klimt's Allegory of Medicine, along with John Singer Sargent's murals, The Triumph of Religion, were almost completely lost to their public. Yet, for me and many others, because of their skillfully-painted representational elements, they are a highly pleasurable experience to look at. We may not understand the symbolism, but we recognize and enjoy the depiction
of the symbols. I would also note in a final observation about allegory that one of its intrinsic qualities not mentioned by Owens, Benjamin, Goethe or Grootenboer is that it provides fertile ground for aesthetic variety, for the unusual, the sensational, for arresting visual arrangement. This, of course, is another attraction for many to the allegories of Klimt, Mucha, and Sargent, but also to contemporary painters like Samuel Bak, Jerome Witkin, and Odd Nerdrum.
In conclusion, I state having a personal preference for Winckelmann's simple definition of
allegory as any image which has meaning. I prefer it to the complex understanding of allegory
accepted and developed by Benjamin and Owens as being subject to melancholy and transience.
Finally, as an artist currently undertaking the creation of a body of allegorical works, any lingering doubts about the relevance of allegorical art in the contemporary art world have been dispelled by the writing of Craig Owens, who has shown that allegory is firmly entrenched in it.

Works Cited

Diefendorf, Jeffrey M. and Mara R. Witzling. The Art of Samuel Bak, Memory and Metaphor,
The Art Gallery, University of NH, 2006

Grootenboer, Hanneke. The Rhetoric of Perspective-Realism and Illusionism in 17th Century Dutch Still-Life Painting. University of Chicago Press, 2005

Owens, Craig. “The Allegorical Impulse.”Art After Modernism: Rethinking Representation.” Ed. Brian Wallis. The New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1984

Peaker, Giles. “Natural History, Kitaj, Allegory and Memory.” Critical Kitaj. Ed. Aulich, James and John Lynch. Rutgers University Press, 2001

Weiss, Jeffrey. Jasper Johns, An Allegory of Painting, 1955-1965. National Gallery of Art,
Washington 2007